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ABSTRACT
In capital intensive industries, ﬁrms face complicated multi-stage ﬁnancing, investment, and pro-
duction decisions under the watchful eye of existing and potential industry rivals. We consider a
two-stage simpliﬁcation of this environment. In the ﬁrst stage, an incumbent ﬁrm beneﬁts from two
ﬁrst-mover advantages by precommiting to a debt ﬁnancing policy and a capacity investment policy.
In the second stage, the incumbent and a single-stage rival simultaneously choose production levels
and realize stochastic proﬁts. We characterize the incumbent’s ﬁrst-stage debt and capacity choices
as factors in the production of an intermediate good we call “output deterrence.” In our two-factor
deterrence model, we show that the incumbent chooses a unique capacity policy and a threshold
debt policy to achieve the optimal level of deterrence coinciding with full Stackelberg leadership.
When we remove the incumbent’s ﬁrst-mover advantage in capacity, the full Stackelberg level of
deterrence is still achievable, albeit with a higher level of debt than the threshold. In contrast,
when we remove the incumbent’s ﬁrst-mover advantage in debt, the Stackelberg level of deterrence
may no longer be achievable and the incumbent may su&er a dead-weight loss. Evidence on the
telecommunications industry shows that ﬁrms have increased their leverage in a manner consistent
with deterring potential rivals following the 1996 deregulation.1 Introduction
Our interest in the use of debt and capacity as factors in the deterrence of a rival’s output is in
part due to recent dramatic shifts in the U.S. telecommunications industry’s competitive land-
scape. Although there has been ongoing e&ort to deregulate the industry over the past 20 years,
the true breakthrough occurred when the 1996 Telecommunications Act removed signiﬁcant barri-
ers in providing telecommunications access to U.S. homes. Subsequent to the Act, the number of
telecommunication ﬁrms has varied considerably. Figure 1 shows that the number of telecommu-
nication ﬁrms increased from 369 in 1995 to 447 in 2000, and then decreased to 282 in 2002 in the
aftermath of the “tech bubble.”1
During that time, the telecommunications industry issued a great deal of debt and deployed
extensive capacity in anticipation of future demand and competition. The Wall Street Journal
reports that “since 1996, telecoms have borrowed more than $1.5 trillion from banks and issued
more than $630 billion of bonds, according to Thomson Financial, a data company - topping all
other industries.” In the same article, the Wall Street Journal also states that “after the opening of
the historically regulated industry to competition, ﬁrms went on a building binge.” “By the time
the internet bubble burst, an estimated 39 million miles of ﬁber-optic cable stretched underneath
the US.”2
The large number of new competitors suggests that the incumbents’ use of debt and capacity
1Based on COMPUSTAT’s sample of ﬁrms with positive asset values (data item 6).
2The article “Domino E&ect-Telecom’s Troubles Spread From Upstarts To Sector’s Leaders” appeared on the front
page A1 on March 13, 2002.
1may not have signiﬁcantly diminished new entry in the telecommunications marketplace. Figure 2
shows that, although concentration decreased from an average Herﬁndahl index of 0.1877 in 1995
to 0.1282 in 1999, it then rebounded to 0.2247 in 2002.3 Following the industry shake-out, many
incumbent ﬁrms have been able to remain dominant players.
While a traditional notion of deterrence is keeping a potential entrant from actually entering,
we are interested in how an incumbent attenuates a rival’s production even when entry occurs.
It is well-known that a ﬁrm’s capacity investment can a&ect its own, and a rival’s, production
choices. Since the inﬂuential work of Spence (1977), capacity and other forms of investment have
been recognized as deterrents to potential entrants. Dixit (1980) analyzes how capacity can commit
an incumbent to a subsequent aggressive production strategy. As an incumbent’s capacity costs
become “sunk” by production time, they e&ectively lower the relevant marginal cost of incumbent
production thereby inducing a traditional Cournot game where the incumbent has a cost advantage.
It then follows from standard Cournot results for duopolists with di&ering production costs, that
the incumbent produces at a level higher than the entrant who is deterred from the higher Nash
production level.4
It is also a well-known theoretical notion that a ﬁrm’s debt commitments can a&ect its produc-
tion choice through convexity in the equity payo&. Brander and Lewis (1986) demonstrate that
debt provides a future incentive to produce more aggressively. An increase in production enhances
3Based on COMPUSTAT’s sales (data item 12) using observations with the same four-digit SIC codes.
4Other papers discussing the e&ect of a ﬁrm’s capacity on its product market include Haruna (1996); Kirman and
Masson (1986); Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998); Reynolds (1991); Rosenbaum (1989); and Zhang (1993).
2the ﬁrm’s equity payo& in good states with a less than o&setting decrease in payo& in bad states
(due to the limited liability of equityholders). The agency problem, a variation of Jensen and
Meckling’s (1976) asset substitution problem, leads to more aggressive production.5
We examine the case where ﬁnancial (debt) and real (capacity) strategies are chosen with the
f o r e s i g h tt h a tt h e ym a ye &ectively precommit the incumbent to produce aggressively and thereby
deter at least a portion of a rival’s production. In dealing with the two factors of deterrence pro-
duction, we integrate two separate branches of the deterrence literature allowing us to address the
interactions and tradeo&s in deterring with debt versus deterring with capacity. For completeness,
we compare our two-factor model to Brander and Lewis’s single-factor model of debt deterrence,
to Dixit’s single-factor model of capacity deterrence, and to the traditional Nash and Stackelberg
solutions. We show that debt and capacity can be, but will not always be, factor substitutes in
the production of deterrence. We demonstrate that the two factors interact to produce deter-
rence through their joint production of convexity in the equity payo&.I m p o r t a n t l y ,h o w e v e r ,t h e
range in which the factors can jointly inﬂuence equity convexity is limited. Because production is
constrained by the capacity in place, adding debt above a speciﬁc threshold level cannot increase
production. Consequently, our deterrence production function exhibits regions where the factors
have Leontief non-substitutability and zero marginal deterrence-product.
At the equilibrium, the incumbent produces at capacity and uses debt to achieve the optimal
5Other papers discussing the e&ect of a ﬁrm’s capital structure on its product market include Bolton and Scharf-
stein (1990), Chevalier (1995), Faure-Grimaud (1997), Fudenberg and Tirole (1986), Fulghieri and Nagarajan (1996),
Khanna and Tice (2000), Kovenock and Philips (1997), Maksimovic (1988), Phillips (1995), Poitevin (1989), Rotem-
berg and Scharfstein (1990), Showalter (1999), and Zingales (1998).
3level of deterrence. The optimal level of deterrence coincides with the Stackelberg leadership
solution. Full Stackelberg leadership is also achieved when the ﬁrm deters with debt only. This
may not be the case when the ﬁrm deters with capacity only. With capacity-only deterrence, the
incumbent may su&er a deadweight loss. Our results suggest that examining debt deterrence on
its own, as in Brander and Lewis, is likely to overstate the amount needed when incumbents also
have ﬁrst-mover advantages in paying sunk capacity costs. Examining capacity deterrence on its
own can be similarly misleading. In fact, when the convexity induced by debt is su^ciently high,
the incumbent may not perceive any advantage to paying capacity costs as a ﬁrst-mover.
Admittedly, the empirical evidence supporting debt deterrence is not overwhelming. Chevalier
(1995) on supermarkets, Khanna and Tice (2000) on discount department stores, Phillips (1995) on
four manufacturing industries, and Kovenock and Phillips (1997) on ﬁrms within ten manufactur-
ing industries show that large recapitalizations tend to lead to softer product market competition,
inconsistent with the prediction of Brander and Lewis. Nonetheless, the rapidly growing telecom-
munication industry may behave di&erently from some of the mature industries considered in these
studies, particularly when the mature industries are consolidating (e.g., the supermarket indus-
try). Additionally, even in the existing studies, there is some evidence that increases in debt may
precede tougher competition. For example, Khanna and Tice show that competition among dis-
count department stores becomes tougher following leveraged buyouts and Phillips ﬁnds that debt
makes the product market competition tougher in one of the four industries he considers (gypsum).
Phillips attributes this di&erent result to the fact that there are less barriers to entry in the gypsum
4market.
This empirical literature takes considerable e&ort to account for the ﬁrms’ endogenous decision
to increase leverage. Instead of dealing with the endogeneity problem, however, our approach
lies with the exogenous deregulation event in the telecommunications industry. Zingales (1998)
also relies on a natural experiment: the rate deregulation and entry in the trucking industry. He
documents that incumbent ﬁrms were negatively a&ected by the rate competition and that those
with the highest existing leverage were least likely to survive. In contrast, our natural experiment
does not deal with a rate deregulation. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms increased their leverage in a manner
consistent with deterring potential rivals.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces our two-factor model of deterrence. Section
3 analyzes the production subgame. Section 4 characterizes the incumbent’s ﬁrst-stage optimal
choices of debt and capacity. Section 5 presents supporting empirical evidence using a sample of
telecommunications ﬁrms around the period of the 1996 deregulation. Section 6 concludes.
2 A Two-Factor Model of Deterrence
We consider two ﬁrms, an incumbent and an entrant, over two stages. Both ﬁrms are risk neutral
and the riskless rate is zero. In the ﬁrst stage, the incumbent maximizes ﬁrm value by choosing
how aggressively it wants to deter a rival’s production through the incumbent’s choice of debt
and capacity. In the second stage, the incumbent and the entrant take the incumbent’s debt and
capacity choices as given and maximize their equity payo&s by choosing how much to produce. The
5following timeline illustrates these choices:
First Stage Second Stage
| |
Incumbent chooses: debt (FI) production (qI)
capacity (kI)
Entrant chooses: debt (FE)
capacity (kE)
production (qE)
Nature chooses: disturbance (˜ z ; [ ¯ Z, ¯ Z])
where, for simplicity, we assume a linear inverse demand function p(qI,q E)=( a +˜ z  b(qI + qE))
with stochastic intercept (a +˜ z)a n ds l o p eb.6 The sequencing introduces the ability for the
incumbent to use debt and capacity (both assumed to be common knowledge prior to production)
to inﬂuence the production subgame equilibrium. The critical feature here, and in Dixit, is that the
incumbent’s debt and capacity choices are observable prior to production, whereas the entrant’s are
not. We assume the incumbent’s choices are irreversible prior to production. The incumbent and
the entrant deploy debt and capacity only once in this model. As we demonstrate below, and Dixit
argues, the incumbent would not deploy additional capacity in the second stage even if allowed.
6As we hope will become obvious, our basic insights are not conﬁned to the case of linear demand although it
provides a very useful tractability.
63 The Production Subgame
We analyze a Cournot production subgame and its Nash equilibria. In this subgame, the incumbent
is constrained to choose only feasible quantities, qI  kI; the incumbent’s capacity costs of rIkI are
sunk; its debt ﬁnancing is ﬁxed; and both debt and capacity are common knowledge. Consequently,
the entrant’s production choice can be adapted to the incumbent’s debt and capacity, raising
explicitly the possibility of strategic deterrence. In contrast, we assume that the incumbent does not
observe the entrant’s debt and capacity choices prior to production and therefore cannot adapt its
production to the entrant’s debt and capacity choices. We assume that ˜ z is drawn after production,
that the only marginal production cost is the capacity cost, and that existing equity bases, if any,
are denoted by 
I and 
E.
3.1 The Entrant’s Best Reply
The entrant chooses debt, capacity, and production simultaneously during the production subgame.
None of these quantities are observed by the incumbent prior to production. In keeping with our
emphasis on the deterrence e&ect of debt, we structure the debt ﬁnancing as a recapitalization to
avoid having the debt o&ering interact directly with the risk of the ﬁrm. We thus assume that any
debt proceeds BE are paid as a pre-production dividend. As a result, we can write the entrant’s




[(a +˜ z  b(qI + qE))qE  rEkE + 
E  FE]d	(˜ z),
7where rE is the entrant’s marginal cost, ˆ ZE is the entrant’s debt default point:
³
a + ˆ ZE  b(qI + qE)
´
qE  rEkE + 
E  FE =0 ,







[(a +˜ z  b(qI + qE))qE  rEkE + 
E]d	(˜ z).
Substituting in for BE, the second-stage equity ﬂow coincides with the total ﬁrm value:
Z ¯ Z
 ¯ Z
[(a +˜ z  b(qI + qE))qE  rEkE + 
E]d	(˜ z)
=( a  b(qI + qE))qE  rEkE + 
E,
where the entrant produces within the capacity constraint qE  kE. This is just the usual linear-
demand Cournot duopolist’s proﬁt plus the initial equity base 
E. The entrant’s best reply therefore
has the usual functional form:8
qE(qI)=
a  bqI  rE
2b
. (1)
The entrant’s capacity is set equal to its production, and its capital structure is irrelevant for the
traditional reasons (no interaction with risk or production, no tax beneﬁt of debt, no default cost,
no information asymmetry, etc.)
7Despite the fact that the rEkE payment is senior to the bond payment, we have not modeled the bond as a
limited liability security. It remains, however, fairly valued.
8A slight time gap between the entrant’s choices of debt and capacity and its choice of production would not
change the result as long as the entrant’s debt and capacity remain unobservable to the incumbent.
83.2 The Incumbent’s Best Reply
There are two inherited characteristics from the ﬁrst stage that must be incorporated into the
second stage equity ﬂow for the incumbent. First, the debt proceeds BI w e r ed i s t r i b u t e di nt h e
ﬁrst stage as a recapitalization dividend and its face value FI must now be paid. Second, the
capacity kI was contractually acquired in the ﬁrst stage and its associated cost rIkI must now be
paid. In order to compare our version of a capacity-free Brander and Lewis debt deterrence model,
the capacity cost must be paid out of second-stage revenues.9 Without capacity, the variable cost
takes the form of a production cost which must be paid out of production revenues.




[(a +˜ z  b(qI + qE))qI  rIkI + 
I  FI]d	(˜ z),
where rI is the incumbent’s marginal cost, and ˆ ZI is the entrant’s debt default point:
³
a + ˆ ZI  b(qI + qE)
´
qI  rIkI + 
I  FI =0 .
In contrast with the entrant’s second-stage problem, note that incumbent’s debt proceeds have
already been paid out at this stage (no analogue of BE here). As the incumbent inherits the
maximum possible production (at capacity) from the ﬁrst stage, the incumbent is constrained in





[(a +˜ z  b(qI + qE))qI  rIkI + 
I  FI]d	(˜ z)
9Paying capacity costs out of production revenues also allows us to consider 
I = 0 since it eliminates any
ﬁrst-stage net outﬂow.
9subject to qI  kI.
Because the default point ˆ ZI is the zero of the integrand, Leibniz’s rule greatly simpliﬁes the
incumbent’s (Karish-Kuhn-Tucker) ﬁrst order conditions. To provide for explicit solutions of the
incumbent’s best reply, we assume for the remainder of our analysis that ˜ z  U[ ¯ Z, ¯ Z]. It is
convenient to ﬁrst deﬁne the unconstrained best reply:
qu
I (qE)=
2a  2bqE + ¯ Z + ˆ ZI
4b
. (2)




I (qE), when qu
I (qE)  kI
kI, when qu
I (qE)  kI.
(3)
3.3 Cournot Subgame Equilibria as Functions of kI and FI
While best replies speciﬁed in equations (1) to (3) are functions of the incumbent’s default point
and capacity, therefore suggesting debt and capacity deterrence, we must remember that the in-
cumbent’s default point ˆ ZI is itself a function of qI and qE. If we substitute in the deﬁnition for
the incumbent’s default point ˆ ZI and solve the best reply functions for the Nash equilibrium, we
ﬁnd a quadratic in qu
I which solves to:
qu
I =
a + rE +2¯ Z + R(kI,F I)
10b
, (4)
10We have chosen to present the best reply in this implicit case format rather than as min(kI,q
u
I (qE)) to facilitate
the application of constraint multipliers in our subsequent derivations.
10where R(kI,F I)=
p
(a + rE +2¯ Z)2 +4 0 b(FI + rIkI  
I) > 0.11 The entrant policy when the
incumbent in unconstrained is:
qu
E =
9a  11rE  2 ¯ Z  R(kI,F I)
20b
,




















E denotes the entrant policy when the incumbent is constrained:
qc
E =
a  bkI  rE
2b
.
3.4 Two-Factor Deterrence Production
It is now possible to see the inﬂuence of the incumbent’s ﬁrst-mover advantages in debt (FI)a n d
capacity (kI) on the entrant in the production subgame equilibrium. In particular, one easy way
11We assume that R(kI,F I) is non-zero in the derivations that follow. This assumption requires only a “small
enough” initial equity base 
I.
















R(kI,FI)  0, for rI  0w h e nqu
I <k I

















R(kI,FI)  0f o r rI  0w h e nqu
I <k I
1
2 < 0, when qu
I >k I
Additional capacity always provide the incentive and means to deter the entrant’s production.
Additional capacity, with its associated sunk costs, increases the amount that the incumbent can
produce at no marginal cost. Additional capacity costs rIkI also decrease the equity payo&,t h e r e b y
increasing the convexity-related incentive to produce. Importantly, for the case of capacity, the
incentives to deter the entrant’s production go in tandem with the means to act on those incentives.
In contrast, additional debt always provides the incentive to deter the entrant’s production
through the convexity e&ect, but it has no direct impact on the means to respond. When capacity
is available to accommodate the unconstrained production level (kI >q u
I ), the incumbent can
act on the incentive: additional debt increases the convexity and the incumbent’s production.
When capacity is insu^cient (kI <q u
I ), the incumbent cannot act on the incentive: additional debt
increases the convexity but the incumbent’s production is constrained at capacity. The incumbent’s
incentive to deter the entrant’s production cannot be satisﬁed and the marginal deterrence of that
additional debt is zero.
12Moving along production subgame equilibria (say by changing FI or kI) changes the production
levels in ﬁxed proportions. The entrant’s best reply function (1) implies that a new production
equilibrium involves an increase in incumbent production if and only if it also involves a decrease in
entrant production at half the magnitude. Our Cournot subgame is, after all, a game of strategic
substitutes. Such a mechanistic relationship between incumbent and entrant production levels
suggests it might be useful to think of debt and capacity as alternative ways to inﬂuence the
entrant’s second-stage production. Any market share vacated by the entrant is cannibalized by
the incumbent as part of a new production equilibrium. In addition to the entrant’s cannibalized
market share, there is also a net expansion equal in size to the cannibalization. The cannibalization
and the net expansion together comprise the incumbent’s production change, which is twice the
magnitude of the entrant’s production change (and opposite in sign). We view this vacated market
space as an incumbent’s “intermediate good” created by the ﬁrst-stage debt and capacity choices.
This allows us to conduct a traditional two-factor production analysis.
We deﬁne a baseline notion of deterrence produced by the incumbent’s ﬁrst-mover advantages.
If we were to collapse our two-stage game into one simultaneous move for both ﬁrms, we would be
in a traditional Cournot duopoly game. In this collapsed game, both ﬁrms would exhibit capital
structure irrelevance and both ﬁrms would produce at capacity.12 Production levels in this collapsed
duopoly game are the baseline levels from which we will measure deterrence, i.e., the change in
12By way of clariﬁcation, Brander and Lewis, in a staged debt-then-production game, allow rivals to condition on
each others’ debt levels. Consequently, their ﬁrms do not exhibit capital structure irrelevance even though the two
stages are played simultaneously.
13production generated by the incumbent’s ﬁrst-mover advantages in debt and capacity. We denote
the baseline Cournot-Nash production strategies by superscript N:
qN
I =




a + rI  2rE
3b
.
These are symmetric when ﬁrms face the same costs (rI = rE). We deﬁne the entrant’s deterred














As we previously argued for our model, the entrant’s best reply (1) implies that the incumbent
deters the entrant’s production by half as much as it expands its own production,  = X/2.
The market therefore expands by an amount equal to the entrant’s deterred production, 
 = .
Consequently, the production deterred from the entrant, , through the incumbent’s ﬁrst-mover
advantages is a su^cient statistic. Speciﬁcally, we are interested in the production function of that
deterrence (kI,F I).




60b , when qu
I  kI
arE+2rI+3bkI
6b , when qu
I  kI.
Figure 3 displays two isodeterrence curves, where the leftmost curve graphs a lower level of deter-
rence. Much of the intuition behind our two-factor deterrence analysis can be argued from this
14ﬁgure:
(1) We know from Dixit that making an incumbent’s capacity costs sunk by production time
is analogous to giving the incumbent a cost advantage in the subsequent Cournot competition.
Mechanically, the cost advantage shifts the incumbent’s reaction function to the right.13 We know
from Brander and Lewis that introducing risky debt makes equity claimants disregard the worst
states of the world. This truncation of the worst states also shifts the incumbent’s reaction function
to the right. In our model, capacity costs and risky debt deter the entrant’s production in precisely
the same way - by allowing the incumbent to shift its reaction function prior to playing a Cournot-
Nash production subgame. More to our point, however, Figure 3 shows that the debt face value
and capacity costs can be perfect substitutes in the determination of the incumbent’s default point,
ˆ ZI. Another way to see this is with equation (2), where ˆ ZI is a relevant location parameter for the
incumbent’s reaction function. Figure 3 labels this as the “Perfect Substitutes Segment.”
(2) Figure 3 also labels a “Leontief Segment.” Along this segment, adding debt above the threshold
level cannot increase the incumbent’s production. This can be viewed as a technology constraint to
the production of deterrence. At a given capacity level, if the incumbent is geared up su^ciently
to produce at capacity, additional gearing cannot increase the incumbent’s production as there is
no capacity to accommodate the increased production.
(3) In our model, as in Dixit, it is always technologically feasible for deterrence to rise with increases
in capacity. By way of distinction, however, Figure 3 indicates that, holding the debt constant,
increases in capacity always lead to a higher incumbent production and a lower entrant production.
This is quite distinct from Dixit. In his equity-only case, if the incumbent considers a defection from
zero excess capacity, the extra capacity is not a credible threat to increase production. Capacity
does not always have a positive marginal deterrence product in Dixit’s context. Zero excess capacity
is an immediate equilibrium result with costly capacity. In contrast to Dixit’s all-equity analysis, our
model with risky debt assures that capacity increases are a credible threat to increase production.
Credibility arises with the additional role capacity costs play in determining the incumbent’s default
point ˆ ZI. Higher capacity costs raise the probability of default and therefore induce convexity-
related deterrence. Even though our context involves capacity increases that are credible threats to
increase production, it remains to be seen whether the beneﬁts of such threats exceed their costs.
(4) Our model assumes no cost to debt ﬁnancing, only a capacity cost. Debt is the cheapest way to
inﬂuence the convexity e&ect in the equity payo& and any resulting convexity-related deterrence. In
terms of its inﬂuence on convexity, excess capacity is equivalent to money-burning. This suggests
13Dixit uses the phrase “generalised Stackelberg” behavior to describe models where one of the duopolists can use
irreversible capacity to dictate its own reaction function in a future production subgame.
15that the incumbent will choose zero excess capacity and costlessly increase gearing to produce any
remaining desirable deterrence. On Figure 3, the equilibrium with zero excess capacity is situated
at the kink. Importantly, in equilibrium, rather than establishing zero excess capacity because it
is not a credible threat to increase production as in Dixit, we establish zero excess capacity due to
debt’s signiﬁcant cost advantage in deterrence production. This suggests that debt ﬁnancing costs
or additional positive capacity externalities could lead to equilibrium excess capacity even when
entry is certain.
4 The Incumbent’s Optimal Debt and Capacity
To conﬁrm our intuition from examining the isodeterrence curves, we roll the production subgame
equilibrium policies back into the ﬁrst-stage optimization problem where the incumbent determines
which debt and capacity the subgame will inherit. This is the mechanism through which the
incumbent is granted ﬁrst-mover advantages - it takes the production subgame equilibrium functions
of kI and FI as given when considering its debt and capacity choices.





[(a +˜ z  b(qI + qE))qI  rIkI + 
I  FI]d	(˜ z),







[(a +˜ z  b(qI + qE))qI  rIkI + 
I]d	(˜ z).
Substituting in for BI, the equity ﬂow coincides with the total ﬁrm value:
Z ¯ Z
 ¯ Z
[(a +˜ z  b(qI + qE))qI  rIkI + 
I]d	(˜ z)
=( a  b(qI + qE))qI  rIkI + 
I. (6)
16Unlike the case for the entrant, the assumption that incumbent’s debt and capacity choices are
common knowledge prior to production needs to be considered formally. For example, capital
structure becomes relevant (as it is in Brander and Lewis). Consequently, we recognize the func-
tional dependencies qI(kI,F I)a n dqE(kI,F I).
The incumbent’s optimal production policy (5) is not di&erentiable in kI at a critical point.
Figure 4 presents a graph of the unconstrained policy, the constraint, and the combination yielding
the non-di&erentiable optimal policy speciﬁed in (5), for a given debt level FI. We proceed by
considering ﬁrst-stage debt and capacity choices separately for: the excess capacity region, kI 
qu
I (kI,F I), which contains the rightmost ﬂat segment; and the exhausted capacity region, kI 
qu
I (kI,F I), which contains the leftmost 45o segment.14
Case 1: Excess Capacity Region (kI  qu
I (kI,F I))
For the excess capacity region, we want to assure that the optimal unconstrained production
policy q	
I = qu
I remains active. Accordingly, we must constrain the optimization to choices that gen-
erate excess capacity, kI  qu
I (kI,F I). From equation (6), we can write the incumbent’s Lagrangian







I (kI,F I)  rIkI + 
I + 	1(kI  qu
I (kI,F I)). (7)
14Even though non-di&erentiability makes a uniﬁed analysis infeasible, continuity of the optimal policy does mean
that we will not have to treat the point of non-di&erentiability separately from its adjacent regions.
17The Karish-Kuhn Tucker ﬁrst order conditions for debt FI and capacity kI are:
2(2a  5	1 +2 rE  ¯ Z)  R(kI,F I)
5R(kI,F I)
=0 ( F O C f o r FI)
2rI(2a  5	1 +2 rE  ¯ Z)+( 5 	1  6rI)R(kI,F I)
5R(kI,F I)





I (kI,F I)) = 0.
Subcase 1a: Excess Capacity Region with kI >q u
I (kI,F I)( i n t e r i o r )
For this region, it must be that 	1=0. The ﬁrst order conditions for FI and kI imply the following:
R(kI,F I)=2
¡






2a +2 rE  ¯ Z
¢
.
For general cases of the parameters a, rE,a n d¯ Z, there is no R(kI,F I) that solves both equations as
they are parallel lines. This contradiction indicates that there is no solution with excess capacity.
This is our analogue to Dixit’s no excess capacity result.
Subcase 1b: Excess Capacity Region with kI = qu
I (kI,F I) (boundary)
For this region, there is no a priori restriction on the multiplier 	1 other than non-negativity.
However, we do have kI = qu
I (kI,F I). Using the incumbent’s unconstrained production policy in
(4) and the ﬁrst order conditions, we can solve for the candidate equilibrium of debt, capacity and
18productions:
FI =
3(a + rE)2  (a + rE)(20rI +4¯ Z)+8 




a + rE  2rI
2b
qI =
a + rE  2rI
2b
qE =
a +2 rI  3rE
4b
,
where 	1 = rI.
Case 2: Exhausted Capacity Region (kI  qu
I (kI,F I))
For the exhausted capacity region, we want to assure that the optimal capacity production
policy q	
I = kI remains active. Accordingly, we must constrain the optimization to choices that
exhaust capacity, kI  qu






a  bkI  rE
2b
¶¶
kI  rIkI + 
I + 	2(qu
I (kI,F I)  kI).
It is important to note, particularly if contrasting with (7), that we have substituted in kI for qI but
put qu
I (kI,F I) in the constraint. The unconstrained production quantity qu
I (kI,F I)i sw h a tm u s t
remain infeasible if we are analyzing equilibria where the production is constrained. The multiplier
reﬂects that an unconstrained incumbent would wish to produce at least as much as the capacity
19(qu
I (kI,F I)  kI). The Karish-Kuhn Tucker ﬁrst order conditions for debt FI and capacity kI are:
2	2
R(kI,F I)
=0 ( F O C f o r FI)






=0 ( F O C f o r kI)
	2  0
qu
I (kI,F I)  kI
	2(qu
I (kI,F I)  kI)=0 .
Subcase 2a: Exhausted Capacity Region with kI <q u
I (kI,F I)( i n t e r i o r )
For this region, it must be that 	2 = 0. The ﬁrst order condition for kI immediately implies:
kI =
a + rE  2rI
2b
qI =
a + rE  2rI
2b
qE =
a +2 rI  3rE
4b
.
The constraint kI <q u
I (kI,F I) implies a lower bound which debt must strictly exceed:
FI >
3(a + rE)2  (a + rE)(20rI +4¯ Z)+8 




This is precisely the same debt level that showed up previously. It must be strictly exceeded so that
debt provides enough convexity-related production incentive to make the unconstrained production
level infeasible within the capacity constraint.
Subcase 2b: Exhausted Capacity Region with kI = qu
I (kI,F I) (boundary)
20As for Subcase 1b, there is no a priori restriction on the multiplier 	2 in this region other than
non-negativity. However, we do have kI = qu
I (kI,F I). Using the incumbent’s unconstrained pro-
duction policy in (4) and the ﬁrst order conditions, we can solve for the same candidate equilibrium
of debt, capacity and productions:
FI =
3(a + rE)2  (a + rE)(20rI +4¯ Z)+8 




a + rE  2rI
2b
qI =
a + rE  2rI
2b
qE =
a +2 rI  3rE
4b
,
where 	2 =0 .
Together Subcases 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b can be combined to give the following speciﬁcation of
equilibria for our two-factor deterrence production model:
F	
I 
3(a + rE)2  (a + rE)(20rI +4¯ Z)+8 














a +2 rI  3rE
4b
.
Excess capacity does not arise. The incumbent therefore builds capacity only to make its production
feasible. Debt is the least expensive way to deter. The incumbent therefore sets the debt at or above
a speciﬁc threshold level in order to achieve the optimal deterrence.15 Debt dominates capacity as
15For a completely di&erent motivation for debt thresholding in a model where uncertainty is resolved prior to
21a factor of deterrence production in our simple model.
We can characterize the optimal level of deterrence of our two-factor model:
 =
a + rE  2rI
12b
> 0.
The entrant’s deterred production is signiﬁcant as it amounts to a sixth of the incumbent’s pro-
duction.
We further compare the optimal production levels to those obtained from a traditional Stack-
elberg game where the incumbent is the ﬁrst-mover in production. The optimal production levels
with a traditional Stackelberg leader coincide with those of our two-factor deterrence model spec-




E, where the superscript S denotes the Stackelberg policies. The
incumbent can achieve the same proﬁtability with ﬁrst-mover advantages in debt and capacity as
it can with a ﬁrst-mover advantage in production.
In order to examine the beneﬁt of debt deterrence over capacity deterrence, it is useful to
consider two modiﬁed versions of our model with: debt only and capacity only. We demonstrate
more clearly how debt deterrence (in the tradition of Brander and Lewis) and our two-factor
deterrence allow the incumbent to achieve full Stackelberg leadership, whereas capacity deterrence
in isolation (as in Dixit) may be inadequate to achieve full Stackelberg leadership.
4.1 Deterring with Debt Only
Given that, in our context, debt is the least expensive way to deter, we examine whether or not
the ﬁrst-mover option in capacity has any value. We alter our model to allow both ﬁrms to choose
production see Williams 1995.
22capacities at the same time as production. Using a similar analysis to what we used for our
two-factor model of deterrence, it is straightforward to show the debt-only deterrence equilibrium
requires a debt level of:
FF
I =
3(a + rE)2  (a + rE)(12rI +4¯ Z)+8 




where the superscript F denotes the debt-only deterrence policies. For this equilibrium level of
debt, the incumbent and entrant productions are precisely the same as under the two-factor model.
The debt level, FF
I , is higher than the two-factor debt threshold, F	





To understand how this debt di&erence arises, we compare the incumbent’s best reply in equation
(2) to its equivalent in the debt-only model. With debt only, the incumbent’s best reply becomes:
qF
I (qE)=
2a  2rI  2bq	




To maintain its production, the incumbent’s debt becomes riskier when it also faces a marginal
capacity cost of rI in the second stage. Comparing the two best reply functions indicates that
the increase in convexity is twice the marginal capacity cost: 2rI = ˆ ZF
I  ˆ Z	
I . Substituting for the
default point deﬁnitions, the increase in debt levels is expressed in terms of capacity costs as in
equation (9).
Even though the incumbent has lost the ﬁrst-mover advantage in capacity, it still achieves the
same proﬁtability by increasing its gearing. The ﬁrst-mover option in capacity is worthless. Because
23debt can costlessly achieve the desired optimal deterrence through equity convexity, the incumbent
is indi&erent about choosing capacity in the ﬁrst stage or contemporaneously with production in
the second stage. The capacity ﬁrst-mover option, as it were, is “at the money.” This contrasts
with the “in the money” nature of Dixit’s capacity ﬁrst-mover option for an all equity ﬁnanced
ﬁrm. We do not, however, want to leave the impression that being a ﬁrst-mover in capacity is never
valued in our context. As we demonstrate below, in the absence of a ﬁrst-mover option in debt,
the incumbent will value the ability to be a ﬁrst-mover in capacity.
4.2 Deterring with Capacity Only
Dixit considers ﬁrst-mover advantages in a two-stage capacity model where the incumbent can de-
ploy capacity in two stages and the entrant deploys capacity only in the second stage at the time
when both duopolists produce. Dixit’s incumbent deploys all capacity in the ﬁrst stage.16 Conse-
quently, Dixit’s second stage capacity investment option is “out of the money” and corresponds to
our single-stage capacity investment structure.
A similar analysis to what we used for our two-factor model of deterrence indicates that the













E , when quk
I  kI
qck
E , when quk
I  kI,
where the superscript k denotes the capacity-only deterrence policies, quk
I , the unconstrained in-
16“We have seen above that at all points that are ever going to be observed without or with entry, the established
ﬁrm will be producing an output equal to its chosen pre-entry capacity.” Dixit, p. 100.
24cumbent’s production, quk
E , the associated entrant’s production, and qck
E , the entrant’s production











a  bkI  rE
2b
.
As before, the analysis of the ﬁrst stage equilibrium proceeds through cases around the non-
di&erentiable kink. Subcase 1a, the excess capacity region where kI >q uk
I , still yields a contradic-
tion. This is Dixit’s result of no excess capacity.
Subcases 1b and 2b, where capacity is equal to the unconstrained production, kI = quk
I ,b y
















Deterrence requires that the incumbent’s marginal capacity cost be positive rI > 0. Subcase 2a, the
exhausted capacity region where kI <q uk
I , produces a di&erent candidate equilibrium of capacity












a +2 rI  3rE
4b
,
if and only if the following condition on parameters is satisﬁed: a + rE  6rI < 0. The condition









a + rE  6rI < 0.
The parameter condition may not always be satisﬁed. Full Stackelberg leadership, the candidate
equilibrium that generates the incumbent’s highest proﬁt, may therefore not always be achieved
without debt deterrence. In contrast, when the incumbent uses debt and capacity to deter, the
incumbent is able to gear up so that the unconstrained production increases above the capacity
level. Without debt, the incumbent can no longer inﬂuence the unconstrained production level.
The equilibrium of the exhausted capacity region may not be feasible.
To shed light on the puzzling parameter condition, we return to the incumbent’s second stage
unconstrained production choice. Without the capacity constraint, the incumbent’s second stage
26production solves the problem:
max
qI
(a  b(qI + qE))qI  rIkI + 
I.
The ﬁrst order condition,
(a  b(qI + qE))  bqI =0 ,
involves two e&ects: one more unit of production increases the incumbent’s revenues by the mar-
ket price ((a  b(qI + qE)), but the increased production also decreases the price on the entire







a  bkI  rE
2b
¶¶
kI  rIkI + 
I.














kI  rI =0 ,
involves three e&ects. First, as in the unconstrained second-stage optimization, an additional unit








. Second, it also directly
decreases the price on all production (bkI). However, in this ﬁrst-stage capacity optimization, the
incumbent incorporates the entrant’s second-stage production best reply. That is, the incumbent
knows that an increase in its capacity by one unit will lead to a production subgame equilibrium
where the entrant decreases its production by a half unit. Therefore, relative to the incumbent’s
second-stage unconstrained production problem, the incumbent choosing capacity within the ex-
hausted capacity region in the ﬁrst period perceives less price erosion from the total production
27¡






. The ﬁnal e&ect of a unit increase in capacity is its marginal cost (rI).
To remain in the exhausted capacity region where capacity is less than the unconstrained produc-
tion level (kI <q uk
















a + rE  2rI
2b
¶
 rI < 0
hp a + rE  6rI < 0.
Full Stackelberg leadership with capacity-only deterrence is achieved only for this conﬁguration
of costs. Otherwise, capacity-only deterrence is inferior from the incumbent’s point of view to
debt-only or two-factor deterrence.
Whether full or limited Stackelberg leadership is achieved with capacity deterrence, it is clear
that, in the absence of debt, the ﬁrst-mover option in capacity is valuable. When the incumbent has
a ﬁrst-mover option in capacity, it generates higher proﬁts than the Nash equilibrium without any
ﬁrst-mover option. In other words, Dixit’s capacity ﬁrst-mover option for an all equity ﬁnanced ﬁrm
is “in the money.” However, as we have seen the ﬁrst-mover option in capacity becomes worthless
(“at the money”) when debt deterrence is also considered.
In contrast, the ﬁrst-mover option in debt remains valuable. Without debt deterrence, the
equilibrium may exhibit a limited ﬁrst-mover advantage, but this limited advantage is potentially
only a fraction of the advantage of the full Stackelberg leader. Because debt is a costless factor
28in the production of deterrence, the incumbent is able to achieve full Stackelberg leadership. The
ﬁ r s t - m o v e ro p t i o ni nd e b ti s“ i nt h em o n e y . ”
4.3 A Numerical Example
To quantify of the di&erences between the three models, we consider the numerical example a =4 ,
b =1 , 













Table 1 shows that the di&erence between the Baseline Nash quantities and Capacity Only quan-
tities can be “small,” while the di&erence between the Baseline Nash quantities and the coincident
Debt Only, Debt and Capacity, and Stackelberg quantities can be much larger.
5 The telecommunications industry
Our simple model predicts that ﬁrms produce at capacity and use debt to deter. We test this
prediction using the natural experiment of deregulation in the telecommunications industry. The
1996 Act of Telecommunications provides a clear line of demarcation for the change in market
structure. Entry and competition in this market were highly regulated before 1996 but free after
1996. Upon deregulation, debt deterrence should simply manifest itself by higher debt levels, over
and above changes related to traditional capital structure determinants. To distinguish between
the strategic use of debt after the deregulation and the cheaper cost of ﬁnancing during the “tech
29bubble,” we also include a control sample. Software ﬁrms have participated to the same “bubble”
without being subject the deregulation event.17
We construct a sample of telecommunications ﬁrms (SIC codes from 4800 to 4899) and software
ﬁrms (SIC codes from 7370 to 7379) from the 1988 to 2002 period using COMPUSTAT Industrial
ﬁles. After winsorizing outliers (upper and lower 1%) and deleting ﬁrm-year observations with
missing data entries, we obtain an unbalanced panel of 8951 ﬁrm-year observations. In total, the
sample includes 476 telecommunication ﬁrms with 2841 ﬁrm-year observations and 1160 software
ﬁrms with 6110 ﬁrm-year observations.
We measure debt as the sum of long-term (item 9) and short-term debt (item 34) divided by
total assets (item 6). We measure capacity as the gross value of property, plant, and equipment
(item 7) to total assets. Figure 5 shows that telecommunication ﬁrms increased their debt ratio
and decreased their capacity intensity after the deregulation. Figure 6 shows that software ﬁrms
decreased both their debt and capacity over the same time period.18 The increased use of debt by
telecommunication ﬁrms following the deregulation is suggestive of debt deterrence.
5.1 Debt Regression Analysis
Traditional non-deterrence determinants of capital structure could explain the increase in debt.
We control for changes in the bankruptcy probability using Altman’s (1968) z-score, perceived
17Our sample does include the period of the anti-trust lawsuit against Microsoft. It remains unclear whether or
not the lawsuit changed the software marketplace.
18Because the telecommunications industry, like most other tech industries, experienced a dramatic rise in valuations
from 1998 to the beginning of 2000 and a sharp decline afterwards, we assess the robustness of our results by measuring
total assets by market value. We obtain similar results.
30growth opportunities using the market-to-book ratio, size using the logarithm of sales, intangibility
using the ratio of intangibles to total assets, proﬁtability using income after depreciation divided
by sales, volatility using the standard deviation of the last two years of sales, sector concentration
using the Herﬁndahl index within each four-digit SIC sector, and market timing conditions using
the Treasury rate. The variables are deﬁned in the appendix.
Table II presents the means of the variables under study. The average market-to-book ratio
for telecommunication ﬁrms decreased after the deregulation, indicating potentially lower growth
opportunities for the average ﬁrm competing in the deregulated environment. In contrast, software
ﬁrms see their average market-to-book ratio increase after 1996.
On average, all other variables behave similarly for telecommunication and software ﬁrms. Firms
in existence during the 1996 to 2002 period are more likely to go bankrupt, as measured by a lower
Altman’s z-score, than ﬁrms during the 1988 to 1995 period. As proxied by the logarithm of sales,
ﬁrms grow larger over time. Both telecommunication and software ﬁrms rely more heavily on
intangibles and depreciate their tangible assets at a faster rate. During the “tech bubble” period,
incomes are lower and volatilities are higher. The telecommunication and software industries grew
less concentrated on average.
An ideal way to capture the e&ect of deregulation is through a dummy variable equal to one if
the ﬁrm year is greater or equal to 1996, and zero otherwise.19 Additionally, we focus our attention
on incumbent ﬁrms. Only ﬁrms present before and after the regime change can use debt to position
19Because market participants may have anticipated the deregulation announcement, we exclude all observations
from the year 1995 and ﬁnd similar results.
31their product market aggressiveness.
We regress leverage on the lagged traditional determinants and dummy variables identifying
the deregulation period and incumbent ﬁrms. Table III presents the debt regression results, where
the estimation is performed with a panel-corrected covariance matrix. Consistent with Figure 5, we
ﬁnd that the telecommunication incumbents’ use of debt increases after the deregulation when we
control for other determinants of capital structure. The incumbents’ average debt unexplained by
traditional determinants increased from 0.2470 prior to the deregulation to 0.3635 post deregulation.
The increase of 0.1165 is statistically signiﬁcant (p-value of 0.00). The software incumbents’ average
residual debt increased slightly from 0.0298 to 0.0421, but the increase of 0.0123 is not signiﬁcant
(p-value of 0.44). The debt increase of telecommunication incumbents is consistent with deterrence.
Most of our results on the traditional determinants of capital structure are in line with empirical
literature.
(1) Altman’s z-score has a negative and signiﬁcant coe^cient. A ﬁrm with a lower Altman’s z-score,
indicating a higher probability of bankruptcy, should maintain a lower leverage. In contrast, we
ﬁnd that higher probabilities of bankruptcy are associated with more debt. This is not surprising
when ﬁrms use debt to deter. Debt deterrence requires that ﬁrms increase their equity convexity
to commit to an aggressive product market behavior.
(2) Market-to-book has a negative but only marginally signiﬁcant coe^cient (with a p-value of
0.09). A higher ratio is consistent with more valuable investment opportunities. Firms with such
opportunities keep their leverage low to mitigate the underinvestment problem.
(3) Firm size has a negative but insigniﬁcant coe^cient. Small and large tech ﬁrms do not di&er
in their use of debt.
(4) Intangibility has a positive and signiﬁcant coe^cient. Firms with more valuable patents and
copyrights borrow more.
(5) Depreciation has a positive and signiﬁcant coe^cient. Firms with assets that depreciate faster
32rely more heavily on debt ﬁnancing.
(6) Proﬁtability has a negative and signiﬁcant coe^cient. Consistent with the pecking order theory,
ﬁrms with more internal funds borrow less.
(7) Volatility has a negative and signiﬁcant coe^cient. Firms with a more volatile sales history
borrow less.
(8) Herﬁndahl Pre-deregulation has a positive but only marginally signiﬁcant coe^cient (with a
p-value of 0.06). When a regulated sector became more concentrated, ﬁrms within that sector
increased their leverage. Herﬁndahl Post-deregulation has a negative but insigniﬁcant coe^cient.
After the deregulation, ﬁrms’ use of debt was not a response to the sector concentration.
(9) Treasury Rate has a positive but insigniﬁcant coe^cient. Firms do not time the market by
varying their capital structure in response to the Treasury bill rate.
Finally, Table III also shows that entrants after 1996 have a lower residual debt than incumbents
after 1996, and that exits before 1996 have a higher residual debt than incumbents before 1996.
This suggests that leverage decreases a ﬁrm’s probability of survival. In the survival regression
analysis below, we show that the beneﬁt of debt deterrence following the deregulation is in fact
positive.
5.2 Capacity Regression Analysis
In the capacity regression, we again control for changes in the traditional capacity determinants:
ﬁrm size, volatility, and sector concentration. In addition, we also recognize that capacity may
decrease simply because the increase in debt is reﬂected in total assets, the denominator of capacity.
We therefore control for the other capital structure determinants: Altman’s z-score, the market-
to-book ratio, intangibility, depreciation, and proﬁtability.
Table IV presents the capacity regression results, where capacity is regressed on the lagged
33determinants and dummy variables using a panel-corrected covariance matrix. In contrast to Fig-
ure 5, we ﬁnd that the telecommunication incumbents’ use of capacity did not change after the
deregulation when we control for the other determinants. The incumbents’ average residual capac-
ity actually increased slightly from 0.6328 prior to the deregulation to 0.6344 post deregulation,
but the increase is not statistically signiﬁcant (p-value of 0.93). The software incumbents’ average
residual capacity decreased slightly from 0.3221 to 0.3145, but the decrease is not statistically sig-
niﬁcant (p-value of 0.56). Telecommunication incumbents did not change their capacity strategy in
response to deregulation, over and above variations explained by traditional capacity determinants.
There is no evidence of capacity deterrence.
Our results on the traditional determinants of capacity are:
(1) Altman’s z-score has a negative and signiﬁcant coe^cient, indicating that ﬁrms with higher
probabilities of bankruptcy reduce their capacity.
(2) Market-to-book has a negative and signiﬁcant coe^cient. Firms with more future growth
opportunities have a lower proportion of assets in place.
(3) Firm size has a positive and signiﬁcant coe^cient. Consistent with Cabral (1995) pointing out
that small ﬁrms may prefer to invest gradually to save sunk costs, smaller ﬁrms are less invested
in capacity than larger ﬁrms.
(4) Intangibility has a negative and signiﬁcant coe^cient. Firms with more intangibles have less
tangible assets.
(5) Depreciation has a positive and signiﬁcant coe^cient. Firms with assets that depreciate faster
must install more capacity upfront. (Remember that capacity is measured gross of depreciation.)
(6) Proﬁtability has a positive and signiﬁcant coe^cient. Firms with more internal funds have
larger capacities.
(7) Volatility has a negative and signiﬁcant coe^cient. Firms with a more volatile sales history
have lower capacities.
34(8) Herﬁndahl has a negative and signiﬁcant coe^cient, both before and after the deregulation.
This is consistent with Booth et al (1991) showing that ﬁrms do not use capacity strategically in
concentrated sectors but instead coordinate and cooperate.
(9) Treasury Rate has a negative and signiﬁcant coe^cient. Firms build more capacity when the
cost of funds is lower.
Finally, Table IV also shows that entrants after 1996 have a lower residual capacity than in-
cumbents, and that exits before 1996 have the highest residual capacity.
5.3 Survival Regression Analysis
Telecommunication ﬁrms responded to the deregulation by increasing their leverage and not chang-
ing their capacity strategy. We now present supporting evidence for the optimality of such a
response. We focus on the “residual debt” and “residual capacity,” i.e., the observed debt and
capacity unexplained by traditional determinants. These residuals should include the strategic ef-
fect of deterrence. If the marginal beneﬁt of debt deterrence is positive, the change in the relation
between a ﬁrm’s survival and its residual debt upon deregulation should be positive.
Firms with positive total assets (data item 6) in 2002 are classiﬁed as survivors. The probability
of survival is regressed against the ﬁrm’s own residual debt and own residual capacity, as well as its
rivals’ residual debt and rivals’ residual capacity. We also include our set of explanatory variables,
and, very importantly, we control for the natural exit rate through time using time dummies. The
estimation uses a probit model.
Table V indicates that own residual debt has a negative and signiﬁcant coe^cient before deregu-
lation (-5.20e-4). Using detailed ﬁrm and product level data, Chevalier, Khanna and Tice, Kovenock
35and Phillips, and Phillips conclude that debt generally makes the product market competition
softer. Indeed, there are many reasons why debt would decrease a ﬁrm’s chance of survival, in-
cluding overhang, distress costs, etc. In this paper, however, we are interested in isolating only
the strategic deterrence beneﬁt of debt. We can do so by comparing the coe^cient of own residual
debt before and after the deregulation event. While the coe^cient of own residual debt is negative
and signiﬁcant before deregulation, it becomes insigniﬁcant after the deregulation (-0.66e-4). The
change (4.54e-4) is positive and signiﬁcant, consistent with a positive beneﬁt of debt deterrence in
response to entry fostered by deregulation.
The table also indicates that own residual capacity has a positive and signiﬁcant coe^cient
before deregulation (0.94e-4), suggesting that increases in capacity in the highly regulated environ-
ment raised a ﬁrm’s chance of survival to 2002. Own residual capacity coe^cient after deregulation
is insigniﬁcant (0.24e-4), and, similarly, the change (-0.7e-4) is negative but not signiﬁcant.
Rivals’ residual debt and capacity before and after deregulation are not signiﬁcant and do not
change signiﬁcantly upon deregulation.
Four other determinants are associated with survival. Firms with more growth opportunities,
as measured by the market-to-book ratio, are more likely to survive, although the coe^cient is
only marginal signiﬁcant. Firms with higher proﬁts are more likely to survive. Firms with higher
volatilities appear more likely to survive, but again this coe^cient is only marginal signiﬁcant.
Firms operating in less concentrated sectors before the deregulation are more likely to survive
through the deregulation and “tech bubble” to 2002.
366 Conclusion
Our model considers debt and capacity as factors in the production of deterrence. The debt face
value and capacity costs can be perfect substitutes in increasing the convexity of the equity payo&.
As Brander and Lewis point out, equityholders facing larger liabilities produce more aggressively.
Producing more increases the ﬁrm’s equity payo& in good states more than it decreases the payo&
in bad states because of limited liability. Because production is constrained by the capacity in
place, adding debt above a speciﬁc threshold level cannot increase the production. Our deterrence
equilibrium is characterized by production at capacity, where the debt is set to achieve the opti-
mal level of deterrence. Our empirical results provide support for our model’s emphasis on debt
deterrence.
Our model recognizes that capacity plays two roles: it constrains production and its associated
costs decrease the equity payo&. In contrast to the all equity ﬁnanced ﬁrm in Dixit, an increase
in capacity becomes a credible threat to increase production. Higher capacity costs raise the
probability of default and therefore induce convexity-related deterrence. Our equilibrium, however,
does not include any excess capacity because debt deterrence is more cost-e&ective. With debt
ﬁnancing costs or additional positive capacity externalities, it is possible that our equilibrium
would include excess capacity.
The incumbent deterring with debt and capacity is able to achieve full Stackelberg leadership,
as though the entire traditional Stackelberg leader quantity were precommitted in the ﬁrst stage
with the entrant dutifully following in the second stage. The incumbent is also able to achieve full
37leadership when it deters with debt only, but not always when the incumbent deters with capacity
only. With capacity-only deterrence, the incumbent may su&er a deadweight loss. The ﬁrst-mover
option in debt is therefore valuable (“in the money”) while the ﬁrst-mover option in capacity is
worthless (“at the money”).
Our two-factor deterrence production model suggests that Brander and Lewis analysis of debt
deterrence on its own is likely to overstate the amount of debt needed for optimal deterrence.
Because capacity is necessary to produce, capacity costs reduce the amount of debt needed to deter.
The results also show that Dixit’s analysis of capacity deterrence on its own may be misleading. In
fact, when the convexity induced by debt is su^ciently high, the incumbent may not perceive any
advantage to paying capacity costs as a ﬁrst-mover.
Our model suggests that ﬁrms produce at capacity and deter with debt. Using the natural
experiment of the 1996 deregulation in the telecommunications industry, we observe that ﬁrms
increased their leverage over and above changes explained by traditional capital structure deter-
minants. Firms did not modify their capacity over and above changes explained by traditional
capacity determinants. The change in the relation between a ﬁrm’s probability of survival and its
debt upon deregulation is positive. While ﬁrms may choose debt levels for a number of reasons, we
focus on the strategic beneﬁt of deterrence. We argue that this beneﬁt is positive. The evidence
suggests that the idea of debt deterrence should be revisited.
38APPENDIX
We construct explanatory variables from the COMPUSTAT Industrial ﬁles. Altman’s z-score
is computed as:
z=0.012 Working capital to Total assets (data item 6)
+0.014 Retained earnings (item 36) to Total assets
+ 0.033 Earnings before interest and taxes to Total assets
+ 0.006 Market value equity to Total liabilities (item 181)
+ 0.999 Sales (item 12) to Total assets,
where Working capital is the di&erence between current assets (item 4) and current liabilities (item
5), Earnings before interest and taxes is the sum of operating income after depreciation (item 178)
and non-operating income excluding interest income (item 190), and Market value of equity is the
price (item 199) multiplied the number of common shares outstanding (item 25).
The market-to-book ratio is computed as the price divided by the ratio of total common equity
(item 60) over the number of common shares outstanding. Both Altman’s z-score and the market-
to-book ratio are deﬁned only for public ﬁrms, which represent 85 percent of the sample. We
therefore pre-multiply the score and the market-to-book ratio by a public dummy.
Firm size is measured by the logarithm of sales; intangibility, by the ratio of intangibles (item 33)
over total assets; depreciation, by the ratio of depreciation (item 14) over total assets; proﬁtability,
by the ratio of operating income after depreciation over sales; and volatility, by the standard
39deviation of the ﬁrm’s sales over the prior two years.





i;j Salesit)2,w h e r e
i denotes a ﬁrm within sector j, t denotes the year, and a four-digit SIC code deﬁnes a sector.
Finally, the treasury rate is the annual series of the constant maturity, one-year treasury bill
rate taken from the Federal Reserve Board website at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/.
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43Table I: Numerical Example
Baseline Nash: N Capacity Only:k Debt Only: F Debt and Capacity: 	 Stackelberg: S
qI 1.3167 1.3500 1.9750 1.9750 1.9750
qE 1.3167 1.3000 0.9875 0.9875 0.9875
kI  1.3500  1.9750 
FI   3.8750 3.6784 
ˆ ZI   0.9750 0.8750 
ProﬁtI 1.7336 1.7550 1.9503 1.9503 1.9503
ProﬁtE 1.7336 1.6900 0.9752 0.9752 0.9752
Note: The numerical example is obtained with the following parameters: a =4 ,b=1 , 
I =0 ,
¯ Z =1 , and rI = rE =0 .05.
44Table II: Means
Telecom Software
Variables: 1988-1995 1996-2002 1988-1995 1996-2002
Debt 0.3706 0.4545 0.1991 0.1888
Capacity 0.8627 0.7413 0.4020 0.3270
Altman’s z-score 0.8028 0.6001 1.2332 1.0375
Market-to-Book 2.2886 1.8897 3.5311 5.3450
Size 5.0616 5.3914 3.1780 3.4199
Intangibility 0.1258 0.1919 0.0499 0.0982
Depreciation 0.0749 0.0837 0.0570 0.0810
Proﬁtability 0.0209 -0.0627 -0.0778 -0.2856
Volatility 79.4859 164.5242 24.1820 32.4343
Herﬁndahl 0.2006 0.1608 0.2752 0.2656
Note: Telecommunications ﬁrms have SIC codes between 4800 and 4899, software ﬁrms between
7370 and 7379. The means are computed on the winsorized data for the upper and lower 1%. We
measure debt as the sum of long-term (item 9) and short-term debt (item 34) divided by total
assets (item 6). We measure capacity as the gross value of property, plant, and equipment (item
7) to total assets. Other variables are deﬁned in the appendix.
45Table III: Debt Regression Results
Telecom Software
Variables: Coe^cients P-values Coe^cients P-values
Altman’s z-score -0.0648 0.00			 0.0370 0.00			
Market-to-book -0.0019 0.09	 -0.0020 0.01			
Size -0.0059 0.16 -0.0044 0.27
Intangibility 0.4485 0.00			 0.2065 0.00			
Depreciation 0.9675 0.00			 0.4376 0.00			
Proﬁtability -0.1492 0.00			 -0.2230 0.00			
Volatility -0.52e-4 0.01			 1.06e-4 0.00			
Herﬁndahl Pre-dereg. 0.1017 0.06	 0.1884 0.00			
Herﬁndahl Post-dereg. -0.0823 0.26 0.0790 0.00			
Treasury Rate 0.0034 0.43 0.0045 0.18
Exits Pre-dereg. 0.3585 0.00			 0.1119 0.00			
Incumbents Pre-dereg. 0.2470 0.00			 0.0298 0.31
Incumbents Post-dereg. 0.3635 0.00			 0.0421 0.10	
Entrants Post-dereg. 0.3483 0.00			 -0.0419 0.10	
Pre vs Post 0.00			 0.44
Telecom vs Software 0.00			
R2 0.2255
number of ﬁrm-year observations 8951
number of ﬁrms 1636
Note: 	, 		,a n d			 indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1%. Debt is regressed on lagged
determinants and dummy variables, using a panel-corrected covariance matrix.
46Table IV: Capacity Regression Results
Telecom Software
Variables: Coe^cients P-values Coe^cients P-values
Altman’s z-score -0.2390 0.00			 0.0283 0.00			
Market-to-book -0.0025 0.00			 -0.0017 0.00			
Size 0.0436 0.00			 -0.0241 0.00			
Intangibility -0.9500 0.00			 -0.3698 0.00			
Depreciation 4.5817 0.00			 2.0730 0.00			
Proﬁtability 0.3119 0.00			 -0.0262 0.05		
Volatility -1.12e-4 0.00			 1.66e-4 0.00			
Herﬁndahl Pre-dereg. -0.2097 0.00			 0.2325 0.00			
Herﬁndahl Post-dereg. -0.4495 0.00			 0.0624 0.01			
Treasury Rate -0.0094 0.01			 -0.0064 0.02		
Exits Pre-dereg. 0.6731 0.00			 0.3329 0.00			
Incumbents Pre-dereg. 0.6328 0.00			 0.3221 0.00			
Incumbents Post-dereg. 0.6344 0.00			 0.3145 0.00			
Entrants Post-dereg. 0.5624 0.00			 0.2136 0.00			
Pre vs Post 0.93 0.56
Telecom vs Software 0.67
R2 0.5874
number of ﬁrm-year observations 8951
number of ﬁrms 1636
Note: 	, 		,a n d			 indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1%. Capacity is regressed on
lagged determinants and dummy variables, using a panel-corrected covariance matrix.Table V: Telecom Survival Regression Results
Variables: Coe^cients T-ratios Marginal E&ects
Altman’s z-score -0.0498 -1.1092 -0.0189
Market-to-book 0.0061 1.8341	 0.0023
Size -0.0198 -1.1588 -0.0075
Intangibility -0.0703 -0.4783 -0.0267
Depreciation -0.2108 -0.3516 -0.0801
Proﬁtability 0.3648 3.6134			 0.1386
Volatility 2.69e-4 1.8712	 1.02e-4
Herﬁndahl Pre-dereg. -0.8393 -3.0487			 -0.3190
Herﬁndahl Post-dereg. -0.09596 -0.2797 -0.0365
Own Residual Debt Pre-dereg. -5.20e-4 -4.2437			 -1.98e-4
Own Residual Debt Post-dereg. -0.66e-4 -1.0521 -0.25e-4
Own Residual Capacity Pre-dereg. 0.94e-4 2.8798			 0.36e-4
Own Residual Capacity Post-dereg. 0.24e-4 1.1529 0.09e-4
Rival Residual Debt Pre-dereg. 1.39e-4 0.3629 0.53e-4
Rival Residual Debt Post-dereg. -1.11e-4 -1.1999 -0.43e-4
Rival Residual Capacity Pre-dereg. -0.24e-4 -0.2875 -0.09e-4
Rival Residual Capacity Post-dereg. 0.54e-4 1.4763 0.20e-4
Pre vs Post P-values:
Own Residual Debt 0.00			
Own Residual Capacity 0.06	
Rival Residual Debt 0.52
Rival Residual Capacity 0.39
Log-likelihood Function -1648.8
number of ﬁrm-year observations from survivors 1375
number of ﬁrm-year observations 2841
number of ﬁrms 476
Note: 	, 		, 			 indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1%. “Residual debt” and “residual
capacity” refer to the observed debt and capacity unexplained by traditional determinants. Time
dummies are included in the probit estimation.










































































































































2Figure 3: Isodeterrence Curves ǻ(kI, FI)
Leontief Segment: 
(i) debt above the threshold has 
zero marginal deterrence product; 
(ii) capacity is at floor for given 
level of deterrence 
Perfect Substitutes Segment:
(i) equal tradeoff between debt dollars 
and capacity cost dollars; 
(ii) capacity lies in the “collared” region 
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